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MILESTONES ON THE ROAD TO KECK
Sigmar Stadlmeier* 
Summary: The article traces the roots of the ECJ’s famous Dassonville 
formula back to similar concepts under competition law and questions 
its direct importation into Art 28 EC as done by the Court. From this 
starting point, the case law to Keck and beyond is analysed with a 
view to track the attempts to limit the scope of Art 28 and the role 
of the proportionality principle in this respect. The conclusion is that 
Keck did at least constitute the right approach, limiting the scope of 
(rather than adding another justifi cation dimension to) Art 28, even 
though it still failed to answer the crucial question as to what consti-
tutes a measure of equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions in a 
general manner. The partial success thus achieved has at least en-
abled the ECJ to leave the proportionality test of individual measures 
of the Member States to the proper venue - the referring courts of the 
Member States.
Introduction
The abundance of writing and case law on Article 28 (formerly 30) 
of the EC Treaty and, in particular, the crucial notion of measures of 
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions is such that readers have not 
been provided with a footnote here. Rather, they are invited to consult 
any European law database of their choice, type in “Art. 28” (or “30”, 
respectively) and then hit “ENTER”. Given the predictable result of this 
small experiment, the reader may ask whether there is anything which 
has not yet been said or written on this subject any number of times, 
such as would merit another paper on it. Indeed, the road to Keck has 
been charted in almost every textbook and commentary on European 
Law one can think of. However, its origin and, in particular, the reasons 
for selecting this very path are less widely known. It all began with one 
original sin, followed by three decades of damage control, with the Court 
at times closely resembling Goethe’s famous Sorcerer’s Apprentice, trying 
to get rid of the spirits it had summoned up, but instead merely opening 
another thread of academic discourse every time it tried to strike them 
down. The apprentice, however, could still rely on his master: “Ah, he 
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comes excited. / Sir, my need is sore. / Spirits that I’ve cited / My com-
mands ignore.”1 
The Tools at Hand: Article 28 and Directive 70/50
When Article 28 of the EC Treaty still was Article 30 (i.e. in the origi-
nal, pre-Amsterdam version) it read:
“Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equiv-
alent effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be 
prohibited between Member States.”
The stipulation inserted between the two commas (“without preju-
dice to the following provisions”), together with the transitional provisions 
of (the former) Articles 31 through 33 to which it referred, was removed 
by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam; yet the core of the provision remained 
unchanged. The fi rst point to be made about Article 28 is that the Treaty 
uses specifi c terms without defi ning their meaning. As far as “quantita-
tive restrictions” are concerned, the transitional provisions of (the former) 
Articles 31-33 had at least given clear hints that trade quotas between 
Member States were the main targets of the fi rst part of Article 28. This 
view was quickly confi rmed by the ECJ in Riseria Luigi Geddo,2 where 
it held “quantitative restrictions” to mean “measures which amount to 
a total or partial restraint of, according to the circumstances, imports, 
exports or goods in transit”. However, there is likewise no defi nition of 
“measures of equivalent effect” to trade quotas, nor any hints comparable 
to those given in Articles 31-33 as to the meaning of the second part of 
Article 28. Once the Court had held that quantitative restrictions must 
restrain (and not merely affect) intra-community trade in order to qualify 
under Article 28, the term “equivalent” -meaning “of equal value” - should 
have been read as denoting measures whose effect is equally detrimental 
to the object of the liberalised trade in goods within the single market as 
that of trade quotas, without fi xing the threshold inherent in the notion 
of “equivalence”. 
Further clarifi cation was needed, and an important step was taken 
by the Commission in adopting its Directive 70/50, which was based on 
the transitional legislative competence under (the former) Art. 33 para. 7, 
empowering the Commission to establish a procedure and timetable for 
1 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s poem Der Zauberlehrling (The Sorcerer’s Apprentice) was 
written in 1779. The crucial passage in its original version reads: „Ach, da kommt der Mei-
ster. / Herr, die Not ist gross! / Die ich rief, die Geister / werd’ ich nun nicht los!“ (English 
translation by Edwin Zeydel (1955), <http://www.fl n.vcu.edu/goethe/zauber_e3.html> ac-
cessed 3 October 2006).
2 Case 2/73 Geddo v Ente Nazionale Risi [1973] ECR 865.
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obligatory elimination of measures with an effect equivalent to quotas. 
Being a transitional measure, this directive lost its binding force with the 
end of the transitional period; nevertheless, it demonstrates the inter-
pretation of a crucial Treaty provision by an organ enjoying certain regu-
latory competences in the area in question. It thus provides important 
guidance for subsequent practice, as has been stressed by the Advocates 
General and the Court on several occasions.3
Art. 2 of Directive 70/50 defi nes the fi rst group of measures to be 
abolished (because they come under the prohibition in Art. 28), namely, 
those which treat imports differently to domestic goods and:
“(...) hinder imports which could otherwise take place, including 
measures which make importation more diffi cult or more costly than 
the disposal of domestic production.”
In particular, Art. 2 covered measures which made imports subject 
to any condition “other than a formality”4 which was to be met solely 
by imports, or which differed from those required of domestic products 
and were thus more diffi cult to satisfy, as well as measures favouring 
domestic products or granting them preferential status. It also provided 
a lengthy, though not exhaustive list of examples.5 Thus the fi rst dimen-
sion of the prohibition on measures having equivalent effect to quantita-
tive restrictions is a ban on discriminatory measures specifi cally targeting 
imports and treating them differently in some way from similar domestic 
goods.
However, Directive 70/50 points to another dimension beyond this 
simple non-discrimination rule. According to the preamble, non-discrimi-
natory measures applying to domestic goods and imported goods alike do 
not, at least as a general rule, have an effect equivalent to that of quanti-
tative restrictions. Nevertheless, Article 3 reads as follows:
“This Directive also covers measures governing the marketing of 
products which deal, in particular, with shape, size, weight, com-
position, presentation, identifi cation or putting up, and which are 
equally applicable to domestic and imported products, where the 
restrictive effects of such measures on the free movement of goods 
exceed the effects intrinsic to trade rules (...).”
3 See Case 75/81Joseph Henri Thomas Blesgen v State of Belgium [1982] ECR 1211; Case 
145/88 Torfaen Borough Council v B & Q plc [1989] ECR 3851 (Sunday Trading); see also 
Advocate General Walter van Gerven in case C-169/91 Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent 
and Norwich City Council v B & Q plc [1992] ECR I-6457.
4 As early as 1971, however, the Court departed from this approach and, in Joined Cases 
51 & 54/71 International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit (No. 2) [1971] 
ECR 1107, condemned even pure formality requirements as unlawful.
5  Council Directive (EC) 70/50 [1970] OJ L13/29 art 2(3).
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Thus, even non-discriminatory trade rules relating to the marketing 
of products, including both requirements to be met by the goods them-
selves (shape, size, weight, etc.) and those relating to the circumstances 
of sale (presentation, putting up) - a point to which we shall have to re-
turn later, may come under the Directive and thus, implicitly, under Art. 
28 of the Treaty, should their negative effects be disproportionate. Thus 
it was Directive 70/50 - rather than the Dassonville or Cassis de Dijon 
judgments, as seems to be the standard view6- which fi rst took Article 28 
beyond the scope of a pure non-discrimination rule.
The Challenge: Dassonville 
The facts of the 1974 Dassonville case7 need not be repeated here. 
One must, however, bear in mind (as the Court made quite clear) that 
this case was concerned with measures discriminating against (paral-
lel) importers,8 who were able to produce the certifi cate of authenticity 
required by Belgian law only with great diffi culty, or not at all. Advocate 
General Trabucchi, explicitly referring to Directive 70/50 in his opinion, 
was not prepared to accept the disputed certifi cate requirement because 
less restrictive means could have been available, and concluded that, in 
any event, the measure in question resulted in arbitrary discrimination 
- if not between goods, then at least between traders.9 However, the Court 
did not adopt either idea, and simply ruled that:
“[a]ll trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable 
of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-
Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions.”10
Thus the (in)famous Dassonville formula came into being. It was im-
mediately criticised by several writers as being overly broad,11 and there 
were doubts as to whether any trading rule could escape the breadth of 
this formula.12 Indeed, the Dassonville formula not only followed Directive 
6 See E White, ‘In search of the limits to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty’ (1989) 26 CMLR 235; 
J Steiner, ‘Drawing the line: Uses and abuses of Article 30 EEC’ (1992) 29 CMLR 749; D 
Chalmers, ‘Repackaging the Internal Market - The Ramifi cations of the Keck Judgment’ 
(1994) 19 ELR 385, already criticised by this writer in 1995 (S Stadlmeier, ‘Contrary to what 
has previously been decided: The search for the rule goes on’ (1995/2) 1 LIEI 9).
7 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoit and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837.
8 Ibid paras 7-9.
9 Ibid 859-63.
10 White (n 6) para 6.
11 See eg D Chalmers, ‘Free Movement of Goods within the European Community: An un-
healthy addiction to Scotch whisky?’ (1993) 42 ICLQ 269, and J Steiner (n 6) 751-752.
12 White (n 6) 235.
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70/50 beyond pure discrimination, but also blurred the notion of dis-
tinguishing between discriminatory measures, which are caught in any 
case, and equally applicable measures, which are caught only if they 
are disproportionate. No signifi cance whatsoever seems to have been as-
signed to either the discrimination or the proportionality element (as dis-
cussed by the Advocate General), and this constitutes the real surprise of 
the Dassonville formula.
The Roots: “Trade between Member States”
Instead of looking at discrimination or the proportionality of equal-
ly applicable measures, the Court seems to have borrowed the concept 
of hindrances to trade between Member States. This concept appears 
in Article 81 of the EC Treaty as one of the central provisions of the 
Community’s competition policy, and seems to have infl uenced the word-
ing of the Dassonville formula to a considerable degree.
Article 81 prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings, or concerted practices if these might af-
fect trade between Member States, and if their object or effect is to pre-
vent, restrict or distort competition within the common market. At fi rst 
glance this may be misleading: the Treaty was made in several languages, 
each of them equally authentic,13 although we fi nd a considerable dif-
ference among them concerning the meaning of this crucial provision. 
The German version of the Treaty uses the term beeinträchtigen, which 
implies that trade must be adversely affected, whereas the English “to 
affect” does not necessarily imply a negative effect. Since an examination 
of the authentic text discloses such a difference in meaning, the objects 
and purposes of the Treaty must be taken into account when determining 
which meaning best reconciles the texts.14
The purpose of the “trade between Member States” requirement in 
Article 81 is merely to defi ne the boundary between areas covered by 
Community law and national law, respectively. Only if intra-Community 
trade is affected does Community competition law apply to the given situ-
ation; anything below that threshold is a matter for the Member States’ 
competition law. This was established in the very early leading cases in 
competition law, Société Technique Minière15 and Consten and Grundig.16 
Although Advocate General Karl Roemer strongly argued that “to affect” 
13 EC Treaty (Treaty of Rome, as amended) art 314.
14 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 art 33(4).
15 Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1966] ECR 235.
16 Cases 56 & 58/64 Établissements Consten SARL and Grundig Verkaufs-GmbH v Commis-
sion [1966] ECR 299, 341.
56 Sigmar Stadlmeier: Milestones on the Road to Keck
means - as in the Dutch, Italian and German versions of the Treaty - “to 
affect adversely”,17 the Court originally adopted a very broad approach 
not expressly calling for a negative effect, and defi ned this element of 
Article 81 as follows:
“For this requirement to be fulfi lled it must be possible to foresee 
with a suffi cient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objec-
tive factors of law or of fact that the agreement in question may have 
an infl uence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of 
trade between Member States.”18
A mere fortnight after this judgment, the Court handed down its 
decision in Consten and Grundig. Again AG Roemer argued as mentioned 
above,19 and this time the Court heard the message, declaring that the 
crucial issue was:
“(...) whether the agreement is capable of constituting a threat, ei-
ther direct or indirect, actual or potential, to freedom of trade between 
Member States in a manner which might harm the attainment of the 
objectives of a single market between States.”20
The resemblance between this “trade between Member States” for-
mula and the wording of the Dassonville formula of eight years later can 
hardly be overlooked. Yet even in this refi ned (post-Consten/Grundig) 
“trade between Member States” formula of Art. 81, the scope is trade as 
such (and not trade patterns or volumes), and an adverse effect on such 
trade must be demonstrated. What can be gained from this for the pur-
poses of Art. 28? White argued that both the addressees and purposes of 
Articles 28 and 81 were fundamentally different, and denied any system-
atic or teleological link between the two concepts that could be helpful 
under Art. 28, while still admitting that even the Court itself had given 
reason to question the validity of this distinction.21 Wils contended that 
Art. 28 at least served a similar purpose, namely, policing the borderline 
between legitimate and illegitimate national trade regulations.22 Advocate 
General Walter van Gerven chose a similar starting point in his opinion 
17 Opinion of AG Roemer in Société Technique Minière (n 15) 256.
18 n 15, 249; emphasis added. Here the translation is correct: the German version of the 
judgment uses the term beeinfl ussen, which means to infl uence, and is as neutral as the 
English term to affect. 
19 Opinion of AG Roemer in Consten and Grundig (n 16) 360.
20  n 16, 341 (emphasis added).
21 White (n 6) 264-5, referring to Case 240/83 Procureur de la République v Association de 
défense des brûleurs d’huiles usagées [1985] ECR 531 (Waste Oils).
22 W Wils, ‘The Search for the Rule in Article 30 EEC: Much ado about nothing?’ (1993) 18 
ELR 475.
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in the Torfaen case,23 the fi rst of the famous Sunday trading cases under 
Art. 28. He conceded that Articles 28 and 81 were addressed to different 
entities (Member States and undertakings, respectively) and, moreover, 
had different types of obstacles in mind (national legislation and cartels, 
respectively),24 but nevertheless contended that they pursued the same 
fundamental purposes with regard to the general aims of the Treaty as 
laid down in Articles 2 and 3, i.e. establishing and maintaining the inter-
nal market. To that extent, he regarded the comparison as feasible, and 
went on to discuss the ECJ’s case law on Art. 81 for the purpose of in-
terpreting Art. 28, applying the market partitioning/penetration concept 
of Art. 8125 to Art. 28. However, the Advocate General limited his discus-
sion to two equally serious and harmful scenarios: on the one hand, a 
per se compartmentalisation (“screening off”) of the internal market into 
national markets, and, on the other, the erecting of barriers which, given 
their entire legal and economic context, render market access more dif-
fi cult and tend to reinforce such compartmentalisation.26 
This limitation of the comparison to genuinely detrimental scenarios 
is most important. The contention is that an uncritical application of 
Article 81 concepts to Article 28 is contrary to both the wording and 
objectives of the Treaty. Under Article 81, the concept of (adversely) af-
fecting trade between Member States is meant to be broader, because its 
function is merely to delimit the sphere of action of Community compe-
tition law; if fulfi lled, this requirement makes Community competition 
law applicable, but does not yet decide as to the lawfulness of the agree-
ment, decision or concerted practice in question. The decisive factor in 
any such conclusion is the second requirement under Article 81, namely, 
the prevention, distortion or restriction of competition. The objective of 
Article 28 is not only to delimit the Community sphere from the national 
23 Case 145/88 Torfaen Borough Council v B & Q plc [1989] ECR 3851, 3876-3877.
24 It should be noted that this distinction was one of the key arguments in the debate fol-
lowing the Angonese judgment (Case C-281/98 Angonese (Roman) v Cassa di Risparmio 
di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECR I-4139) against extending the effects of market freedoms to 
relationships between individuals. According to R Streinz and A Leible, ‘Die unmittelbare 
Drittwirkung der Grundfreiheiten’ (“The direct third party effect of market freedoms”) (2000) 
11 EuZW 459, the Treaty explicitly provides for such an extension whenever it intends to 
create such an effect. The fact that this was not the case under art 39 should be understood 
as a deliberate decision against it. For a different view, see this writer in ‚Gemeinschaftli-
che Grenzen für die Privatautonomie? Zur Drittwirkung von Freiheiten des Binnenmarkts‘ 
(“Limits on private autonomy under Community law? On third party effects of market 
freedoms”) (2000/01) 11 JAP 245.
25 Established in leading cases on competition law such as Consten and Grundig (n 16), 
Brasserie de Haecht I (Case 23/67Brasserie de Haecht SA v Wilkin [1967] ECR 407) and 
Vereniging van Cementhandelaren (Case 8/72 Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Com-
mission [1972] ECR 977).
26 n 23, 3877-3878.
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sphere in regulating trade, but also to decide uno actu as to the lawful-
ness of the national measure.27 The wording of Article 28 suggests that 
any adverse effects must hinder trade between Member States in a man-
ner equally severe as those of quotas. In short, the comparison made by 
the Advocate General in Torfaen, which was limited to scenarios with an 
effect equivalent to quotas, is supported by the Treaty; the ECJ’s merely 
importing this concept into Art. 28 in Dassonville is not.
Steiner has reminded us that the scope of the Dassonville formula 
(“directly or indirectly, actually or potentially”) must be limited by the 
preceding verb “hindering”, noting a tendency to blur the distinction 
between Art. 81, which is aimed at agreements that affect trade, and 
Art. 28, which is aimed at measures that hinder trade.28 Unfortunately, 
Steiner’s reasoning is based on the plain English wording of the Treaty, 
rather than on the interpretation given to it in the Court’s case law, which 
makes this distinction look more clear-cut than it actually is. The distinc-
tion between “affect” and “hinder” is a matter of principle; the distinction 
between “affect adversely” and “hinder equally as severely as quotas” is 
only a matter of degree. Nevertheless, this distinction is the crucial issue 
in interpretation of Art. 28, and ought to have been the starting point for 
reducing the scope of the Dassonville formula in the Court’s case law.
“Spirits that I’ve cited / My commands ignore”: The Road from 
Cassis to Keck
“Mandatory Requirements”
In Cassis de Dijon,29 the Court had to deal with a non-discriminatory 
ban on the sale of medium-strength liquor in Germany. It held that, in 
the absence of Community legislation, it was for the Member States to 
regulate all matters relating to the production and marketing of the bev-
erages in question, and went on to state as follows:
“Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from dis-
parities between the national laws relating to the marketing of the 
products in question must be accepted in so far as those provisions 
may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory 
requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fi scal su-
pervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial 
transactions and the defence of the consumer.” 30
27 Stadlmeier (n 6) 18.
28 n 6, 754-8.
29 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 
649 (Cassis de Dijon).
30 n 29 para 8.
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Certainly the all-embracing Dassonville formula, lacking any element 
of proportionality, would have covered any of these measures, whether 
they satisfi ed such mandatory requirements or not. Finally, the Court re-
turned to the original concept of Directive 70/50, amending it so that not 
simply the “intrinsic effects” of trade rules, but rather only those neces-
sary to satisfy certain mandatory requirements, could justify such rules 
under Art. 28, subject to a proportionality test.31 In hindsight, however, 
the true signifi cance of Cassis de Dijon lay in its impact on the develop-
ment of the internal market and its powerful signal that each and every 
obstacle need not be levelled by secondary legislation and the harmonisa-
tion or approximation of laws. Even in the absence of such legislation, the 
remaining obstacles in the national rules had to be justifi ed; otherwise, 
market freedoms would prevail.32 If not for Cassis, eurosclerosis might 
well have stalled the internal market.
The Court’s Proportionality Test
In numerous follow-up judgments to Cassis, the Court elaborated 
this concept. The list of acceptable mandatory requirements in Cassis 
is demonstrative (“in particular”) rather than enumerative: working con-
ditions,33 cultural policy,34 protection of the environment,35 even main-
taining a permanent economic infrastructure independent of seasonal 
tourism industries36 have all been added to the list. Likewise, the Court 
elaborated a proportionality test, requiring an objective which is not only 
mandatory but also accepted by Community law37 and a measure which 
is capable of achieving this objective and is, moreover, proportionate 
thereto; the Court usually (merely) reads this as a requirement that the 
national rule in question constitute the least restrictive measure capable 
of achieving the desired result.38 The overall evaluation of proportional-
31 In light of Directive 70/50, it seems ill-founded to accuse the Court of “judicial legisla-
tion” (see eg N Green and others, The Legal Foundations of the Single European Market (OUP, 
Oxford 1991) 65).
32 Cf. the Commission’s reaction to the judgment, published in [1980] OJ C256/2 .
33 Case 155/80 Summary proceedings against Sergius Oebel [1981] ECR 1993.
34 Cases 60 & 61/84 Cinéthèque SA and others v Fédération nationale des cinémas français 
[1985] ECR 2605.
35 Case 240/83 “Waste Oils” (n 35); Case 302/86 Commission v. Denmark (n 35); Case C-
2/90 Commission v Belgium [1994] ECR I-4431 (Walloon Wastes).
36  Case C-302/97 Konle v Austria [1999] ECR I-3099, para 40.
37 See Cases 302/86 Commission v Denmark [1988] ECR 4607 ( Containers for Beer and 
Soft Drinks), para 6, and 240/83 Procureur de la République v Association de défense des 
brûleurs d’huiles usagées [1985] ECR 531 (Waste Oils), para 12.
38 A textbook analysis of the proportionality test is given by Advocate General Walter van 
Gerven in his opinion in case C-169/91 Stoke-on-Trent and Norwich City Council v B & Q 
(n 3).
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ity as such (strict proportionality review: “… is it worth it?”39) has, more 
often than not, been left to the Member State in question, which is un-
derstandable given the fact that the vast majority of cases under Art. 
28 were brought before the Court as preliminary references under Art. 
234. In this role, the Court is merely called upon to interpret provisions 
of Community law; drawing conclusions concerning national legal pro-
visions is the job of the referring national court. It can even be shown 
that, in certain distinct groups of cases, such as those concerning re-
strictive foodstuff regulations, the Court’s approach to the proportionality 
test was the same under preliminary reference procedures, in which any 
strict proportionality review must be reserved for the national court, and 
under infringement procedures based on very similar facts, where the 
Court could have performed - but did not perform - a full analysis of the 
national legal provisions, including qualifi cation under a strict propor-
tionality test.40
From a doctrinal pointof view, one could debate whether these manda-
tory requirements are to be understood as “justifi cations” like those of Art. 
30, meaning that national rules satisfying such requirements are caught 
by Art. 28, yet justifi ed; or whether the Court intended to limit the range of 
Art. 28 by exempting such national rules. Unfortunately, the Court chose 
the middle ground. On the one hand, in the early days it regarded national 
rules satisfying mandatory requirements as not being caught by Art. 28,41 
while, on the other, it would only adopt this position after performing the 
same full-scale proportionality test as under Art. 30.42 If a national rule 
must pass a full-scale proportionality test before it is cleared, the remain-
ing difference between an exemption under the mandatory requirements 
test and a justifi cation under the Art. 30 test becomes insignifi cant, and the 
corresponding debate is moot. Moreover, the Court gradually blurred the 
original distinction in Directive 70/50 between discriminatory measures 
and equally applicable measures, with the latter qualifying for justifi cation 
as mandatory requirements only after passing a proportionality test, while 
mandatory requirements were even accepted with regard to discrimina-
39  This writer wishes to thank Don Regan for his stimulating comments (“Is it worth it?”) at 
the 2006 Dubrovnik Jean Monnet seminar on advanced issues of European law (February 
27-March 4).
40 Cf. Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 1227 (Punity Requirement) (in-
fringement proceedings) and Cases 407/85 Drei Glocken v USL [1988] ECR 4233, and 
90/86 Zoni [1988] ECR 4285 (Italian Pasta cases-preliminary reference proceedings); see 
also S Stadlmeier, ‘Le Gourmet Europeén’ in Köck and others (editors), Liber Amicorum Peter 
Fischer (Vienna 2004) 529.
41 Cf. the Cinéthèque judgment (n 34), which states in para 24 that art 28 “does not apply” 
to such national legislation. 
42 For a prototype of the Court’s approach, again see Case 178/84 Commission v Germany 
[1987] ECR 1227 (Purity Requirement).
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tory measures.43 As the trigger cases were concerned with environmental 
protection, one could argue that this was merely a particular regime for a 
particular purpose; however, in light of all that has been said so far, it is 
diffi cult to avoid seeing a general trend in the Court’s doctrine, one which 
goes far beyond the establishment of particular regimes in particular sec-
tors. Initially, this doctrine did not include the “limited” approach later 
suggested by AG van Gerven in Torfaen, i.e. taking into account only the 
genuinely detrimental effects of national trade rules; rather, it combined a 
pure Dassonville approach with a uniform proportionality review that was 
limited to a least restrictive means test, treating the proportionality test 
thereby established as a general principle of Community law.44
In the opinion of this writer, the latter moment proved to be the worst. 
By rejecting any inherent threshold and dealing with all Dassonville-
type measures, however “potential” and “indirect” their impact on intra-
Community trade may have been, the Court invited a torrential fl ood of 
preliminary references covering all kinds of national trade regulations, 
including measures governing the marketing of products in the widest 
sense of the term (shape, packaging, sales promotion, advertising, etc.), 
which could arguably have had negative side effects on imports, or at 
least on the volume of imports. Until just before Keck there was noth-
ing to encourage traders or courts in the Member States to consider a 
different approach. The most signifi cant early case in this respect was 
Oosthoek,45 in which a trader contested a national rule prohibiting free 
gifts in conjunction with the sale of books (encyclopaedias), arguing that 
a ban on this particularly effective promotional method had negative ef-
fects on the volume of his trade. The Court was ready to accept this argu-
ment, which relied merely on some hypothetical negative effects (rather 
than a hindrance equally as severe as a trade quota):
“Legislation which restricts or prohibits certain forms of advertis-
ing and certain means of sales promotion may, although it does not 
directly affect imports, be such as to restrict their volume because it 
affects marketing opportunities for the imported product.
“The possibility cannot be ruled out that to compel a producer either 
to adopt advertising or sales promotion schemes which differ from 
43 Case 16/83 Prantl (Karl) [1984] ECR 1299 (Bocksbeutel Bottles); Case C-2/90 Commis-
sion v Belgium (n 35).
44 See Case 122/78 Buitoni SA v Fonds d’Orientation et de Regularisation des Marches Ag-
ricoles [1979] ECR 677; Case 66/82 Fromençais v FORMA [1983] ECR 395; Case 181/84 
The Queen v. Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce, ex parte E.D. & F. Man (Sugar) Ltd. 
[1985] ECR 2889; Case 137/85 Maizena v Council [1987] ECR 4587; Case C-365/92 Henrik 
Schumacher v Bezirksregierung Hannover [1993] ECR I-6071.
45 Case 286/81 Criminal Proceedings against Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij BV [1982] 
ECR 4575.
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one Member State to another or to discontinue a scheme which he 
considers to be particularly effective may constitute an obstacle to 
imports (...) even if the legislation in question applies to domestic 
products and imported products without distinction.”46
Oosthoek was frequently looked to as a precedent, and even cited by 
the Court and its Advocates General, such as in Buet47 (a ban on canvass-
ing for educational materials in private dwellings) and GB-INNO48 (a ban 
on quoting regular prices during special discount sales). Legal writers 
have tried to divide the measures involved in these and similar cases into 
several groups according to their nature, proposing several additional 
tests to be applied under Art. 28.49 Yet what is most important to note is 
that the common feature of the measures involved in these cases is how, 
lacking a proper defi nition of the hindrance threshold in the Dassonville 
formula, they were all - explicitly or implicitly - regarded as having passed 
the Dassonville test; and this even though, at best, they affected the vol-
ume of trade, thus requiring a thorough analysis of their ability to sat-
isfy mandatory requirements, the necessity of their doing so, and their 
proportionality in this respect, so as to clear them under Art. 28. Thus 
a full-scale “mandatory requirements and proportionality test” had to 
be performed by the Court in each individual case, with the prospect 
of its being confronted with “countless new mandatory requirements”.50 
Moreover, the Court was required to decide as to the reasonableness of 
national policy decisions in a number of cases which, arguably, it should 
not have even dealt with, to such an extent that White worried about Art. 
28 becoming “a quasi-constitutional instrument which complainants and 
courts can use to question the justifi cation and ‘proportionality’ of virtu-
ally all State measures regulating society”.51 All of this because the Court 
had never addressed the crucial question: when does a national measure 
not merely affect trade in an indirect or potential or merely hypothetical 
manner, but hinder trade among Member States in a manner as severe 
as quotas?
The climax of this development was reached in the fi rst Sunday trad-
ing case, Torfaen. In his opinion, Advocate General Walter van Gerven 
46 n 45 para 15.
47 Case 382/87 R. Buet and Educational Business Services (EBS) SARL v Ministère Public 
[1989] ECR 1235.
48 Case C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM v Confédération du commerce Luxembourgeois Asbl [1990] 
ECR I-667.
49 K Mortelmans, ‘Article 30 of the EEC Treaty and legislation relating to market circum-
stances: Time to consider a new defi nition?’ (1991) 28 CMLR 115; WH Roth, commenting on 
Keck in (1994) CMLR 845, 849-50; White (n 6) 248-56.
50 Advocate General Walter van Gerven in his opinion in Torfaen (n 23) 3880.
51 White (n 6) 239.
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warned the Court of the consequences of this very development52 and (at 
long last) urgently proposed a more restrictive approach to the Dassonville 
formula by adopting the “screening off national markets” concept from 
the case law on Art. 81, as discussed above. However, the Court de-
cided the fi rst Sunday trading case in line with its traditional approach, 
surprisingly referring to Directive 70/50 rather than applying the full 
proportionality test developed in the Cassis de Dijon follow-up cases. It 
accepted national rules governing hours of work, delivery and sale as a 
legitimate part of economic and social policy consistent with the objec-
tives pursued by the Treaty,53 referring to a mandatory requirement al-
ready familiar in principle from the Oebel case.54 The next Sunday trading 
cases, Conforama55 and Marchandise,56 followed the same pattern. In his 
opinion in both cases, Advocate General van Gerven recognised that the 
Court had not followed him in Torfaen, and proceeded “on the assump-
tion that the Court has opted in favour of the Dassonville rule once and 
for all”. He examined the facts according to the standard patterns of the 
mandatory requirements and proportionality test, concluding that the 
legislation in question was necessary, justifi ed and proportionate and 
should be cleared under Art. 28.57 Indeed, the Court once again accepted 
side effects on the volume of trade as falling under the Dassonville for-
mula, and held that:
“[n]ational legislation which prohibits the employment of staff on 
Sundays (...) is not designed to control trade. Nonetheless, it may 
entail restrictive effects (...), may have negative repercussions on the 
volume of sales and hence on the volume of imports.”58
Only in Stoke-on-Trent,59 the last Sunday trading case prior to Keck, 
did the tide begin to turn. Advocate General van Gerven once again de-
livered an opinion on the case, and found no reason to distinguish it 
from Torfaen, Conforama or Marchandise. Surprisingly, he succeeded in 
convincing the Court even though he had already given up on any further 
attempts to that end. The Court obviously believed that the scope of ap-
plication given to the Dassonville formula had been too broad. Yet instead 
52 n 50.
53 n 23 paras 13 and 15.
54 Case 155/80 Summary Proceedings against Sergius Oebel [1981] ECR 1993.
55 Case C-312/89 Union départmentale des syndicats CGT de l’Aisne v SIDEF Conforama 
and others [1991] ECR I-997.
56 Case C-332/89 Criminal Proceedings against André Marchandise and others [1991] ECR 
I-1027.
57 Opinion of Advocate General Walter van Gerven on Conforama and Marchandise (n 55) 
1011.
58 Conforama (n 55) para 8; Marchandise (n 56) para 9 (emphasis added).
59 Case C-169/91 Stoke-on-Trent and Norwich City Council v B & Q [1992] ECR I-6635.
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of immediately introducing a defi nition of the hindrance threshold, the 
Court dealt with the problem only at the next stage, under the propor-
tionality test:
“Appraising the proportionality of national rules which pursue a le-
gitimate aim under Community law involves weighing the national 
interest in attaining that aim against the Community interest in en-
suring the free movement of goods.
“In that regard, in order to verify that the restrictive effects on intra-
Community trade of the rules at issue do not exceed what is neces-
sary to achieve the aim in view, it must be considered whether those 
effects are direct, indirect or purely speculative, and whether those 
effects do not impede the marketing of imported products more than 
the marketing of national products.”60
The additional turnover lost due to the closing of shops on Sundays 
not only affected trade in domestic and foreign goods alike, but was above 
all considered to be merely speculative, and so for this reason (and not 
for satisfying any mandatory requirement in a proportionate way) the 
prohibition under Art. 28 simply did not apply to national legislation 
prohibiting retailers to open their premises on Sunday. In this writer’s 
words, the result of the proportionality test was that its performance had 
been made redundant; it should not have been performed at all.61 It was 
time for a change.
Keck and Its Follow-up Cases
In the Keck and Mithouard cases,62 the Court cleared the contested ban 
on resale at a loss as applying to any sales activities carried out within a 
national territory, regardless of the nationality of the traders or the origin 
of the goods. The Court fi nally set out to directly address the crucial 
hindrance threshold at the proper level, i.e. the applicability of Art. 28, 
rather than at the level of possible justifi cation thereunder, as it had 
done before:
“Such legislation may, admittedly, restrict the volume of sales, and 
hence the volume of sales of products from other Member States, in 
60 n 59 para 15.
61 Again see this writer (n 6).
62 Joined cases C-267 & 268/91 Criminal Proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel 
Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097. For comments see D Chalmers, ‘Repackaging the Internal 
Market - The Ramifi cations of the Keck Judgment’ (1994) 19 ELR 385; S Moore, ‘Re-visiting 
the limits of Article 30 EEC’ (1994) 19 ELR 195; N Reich, ‘The “November Revolution” of the 
European Court of Justice: Keck, Meng and Audi revisited’ (1994) 31 CMLR 459; WH Roth 
(1994) CMLR 845.
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so far as it deprives traders of a method of sales promotion. But the 
question remains whether such a possibility is suffi cient to char-
acterize the legislation in question as a measure having equivalent 
effect to a quantitative restriction on imports.”63
In view of traders’ increasing tendency to invoke Art. 28 as a means 
of challenging any rules limiting their commercial freedom (a tenden-
cy which, as we have seen, the Court itself had created and reinforced, 
just as Goethe’s Sorcerer’s Apprentice created a force which eventually 
threatened to fl ood the shop), the Court then announced point-blank that 
it would re-examine and clarify its case law, stating that:
“…contrary to what has previously been decided, the application to 
products from other Member States of national provisions restricting 
or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member 
States within the meaning of the Dassonville judgment (...), provided 
that those provisions apply to all affected traders operating within 
the national territory and provided that they affect in the same man-
ner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of 
those from other Member States.
“Where those conditions are fulfi lled, the application of such rules to 
the sale of products from another Member State meeting the require-
ments laid down by that State is not by nature such as to prevent 
their access to the market or to impede access any more than it 
impedes the access of domestic products. Such rules therefore fall 
outside the scope of Article [28] of the Treaty.”64
Comments on Keck
The newly-established doctrine was quickly confi rmed by the Court 
in the fi rst series of follow-up cases, which included Hünermund,65 
Clinique,66 Tankstation67 and Punto Casa.68 However, neither Keck nor any 
of these early follow-up cases provide answers to some lingering ques-
63 Keck (n 62) para 13.
64 Keck (n 62) paras 14-17.
65 Case C-292/92 Ruth Hünermund u.a. v Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg 
[1993] ECR I-6878.
66 Case C-315/92 Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb e.V. v Clinique Laboratoires SNC and Estée 
Lauder Cosmetics GmbH [1994] ECR I-317.
67 Joined cases C-401 & 402/92 Tankstation t’Heukske vof and J.B.E. Boermans [1994] 
ECR I-2199.
68 Joined cases C-69 & 258/93 Punto Casa SpA v Sindaco del Comune di Capena [1994] 
ECR I-2355.
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tions. Is the Dassonville formula still valid? Has it been reshaped (minus 
certain non-discriminatory sales arrangements), or, as argued by some 
writers,69 abandoned altogether? How is the category of “sales arrange-
ments” to be properly defi ned? What does restricting the test to “certain” 
sales arrangements mean? This writer has suggested a few answers to 
these questions and voiced some concerns over the approach taken by 
the Court. These need not be repeated here;70 a few comments on the 
most important issues will suffi ce.
The Court did not clearly identify which cases were to be considered 
as overruled. Looking at the wording of the judgment, and taking into 
account the development of the doctrine and case law outlined above, it 
seems that, at the very least, the trade volume approach from Oosthoek 
to Conforama, i.e. one specifi c application given to the Dassonville for-
mula in subsequent case law, should be regarded as overruled, while the 
formula itself, with special reference to the inherent hindrance threshold, 
still stands.
This writer considers it practically redundant to recall that Art. 28 
prohibits measures of equivalent effect - rather than of equivalent nature - 
to quantitative restrictions; hence the Court should have defi ned its Keck 
test with regard to the effects of measures, rather than their nature,71 
and should have used this approach to give a general defi nition of the 
hindrance threshold. Not only did the Court adopt the wrong approach 
altogether, it did so in a piecemeal, inconsistent manner, exempting cer-
tain selling arrangements yet defi ning neither what a selling arrangement 
is (and how to distinguish the spheres of production and marketing for 
such purposes) nor which (“certain”?!) selling arrangements come under 
this exemption and which do not. This approach could not but fail to 
meet one of its express objectives, i.e. reducing the Court’s workload.
Numerous attempts have been made to address the specifi c “hin-
drance” threshold, the crucial issue behind Art. 28; AG van Gerven’s 
opinion in Torfaen was one of them. A few years earlier, AG Slynn in 
Cinéthèque had made another attempt. Focusing on imports, he suggest-
ed that a measure not specifi cally directed against imports, not discrimi-
nating against them, not making it any more diffi cult for an importer to 
sell his products than for a domestic producer, and not giving any protec-
tion to domestic producers would not prima facie come under Art. 28.72 
Steiner proposed a combined defi nition with regard to indistinctly appli-
69 D Chalmers (n 11) 269.
70 n 61.
71 n 70; see also the opinion of Advocate General Walter van Gerven in Torfaen (n 23) 
3870.
72 Cinéthèque (n 34) 2611.
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cable measures: these either operated to the advantage of the domestic 
product by making imports more diffi cult, more burdensome, more costly 
or even impossible, or, even without conferring such an advantage, un-
dermined the single market principle by precluding imports or restricting 
market opportunities.73 More than ten years ago, this writer predicted 
that the search for the rule would go on,74 and so far this has proved to 
be right. There is still unfi nished business for the Court to do.
Afterthought: A New Approach?
Despite its doctrinalshortcomings and the need for further clarifi ca-
tion, Keck has had a sobering effect in that the tendency to subject every 
national trade regulation to scrutiny under the proportionality test has 
been halted: whatever falls under the Keck formula is no longer subject 
to the proportionality test. Moreover, the Court may have reconsidered 
its own past activity in this area, recalling its limited role under prelimi-
nary reference proceedings, as may be seen in more recent cases such 
as Gourmet International Products.75 Faced, as several times before, with 
a comprehensive ban on advertising for a certain category of products, 
the Court held that Keck did not apply, since the national rule, although 
concerned with sales promotion activities, had a worse effect on imports 
than on domestic products:
“… [T]he Court is able to conclude that, in the case of products like 
alcoholic beverages, the consumption of which is linked to tradition-
al social practices and to local habits and customs, a prohibition of 
all advertising directed at consumers in the form of advertisements 
in the press, on the radio and on television, the direct mailing of 
unsolicited material or the placing of posters on the public high-
way is liable to impede access to the market by products from other 
Member States more than it impedes access by domestic products, 
with which consumers are instantly more familiar.”76
With regard to the proportionality test, the Court took a textbook 
“preliminary reference” approach, refraining from performing a full-scale 
test and merely reminding the national court of the legal framework for 
such a test under Community law, thereby leaving the matter for the na-
tional court to resolve:
73 J Steiner (n 6) 754-5.
74 n 61, 33.
75 Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen v. Gourmet International Products AB [2001] 
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“Second, the decision as to whether the prohibition on advertising at 
issue in the main proceedings is proportionate, and in particular as 
to whether the objective sought might be achieved by less extensive 
prohibitions or restrictions or by prohibitions or restrictions having 
less effect on intra-Community trade, calls for an analysis of the 
circumstances of law and of fact which characterise the situation in 
the Member State concerned, which the national court is in a better 
position than the Court of Justice to carry out.”77
Some of the messages have fi nally been heard in Luxembourg. 
77 Gourmet (n 75) para 33.
